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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  As information technology products and services begin to account for larger shares 
of international trade, and as companies engaging in foreign direct investment begin to 
focus more on high-technology areas with attendant risks to intellectual property, the 
importance of information security will continue to grow.  A key component of any 
robust information security system is cryptography.  Cryptography allows for the 
protection of sensitive information, either in storage or in communication, and is a 
necessary feature of any secure e-commerce or electronic communication system 
(including secure email and voice communication).  In the United States, there are few 
restrictions on the use of cryptography.  When operating overseas, however, companies 
must grapple with a bewildering array of regulations and restrictions on the use of 
cryptography.  Some countries restrict the import or export of cryptographic technology, 
others restrict the import of encrypted data, and still others restrict or prohibit the use of 
 
* J.D., 2013, Northwestern University School of Law. 
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encryption within their borders.  These regulations create immense difficulties for firms 
attempting to operate overseas, especially where prohibitions on the use of encryption 
force them to put their intellectual property at risk of compromise.  Furthermore, the 
United States places restrictions on the export of encryption technology, and these 
restrictions can place companies operating overseas at risk of severe penalties if 
cryptography systems are exported to prohibited countries or entities.  
¶2  With the meteoric rise of the Internet and e-commerce in the 1990s came great 
attention to the problems and opportunities associated with cryptography.  Throughout 
that decade, the United States and many foreign countries debated and experimented with 
various forms of cryptography regulation, and attempts were made at international 
harmonization.  Since then, however, policy-making activity around cryptography has 
slowed, if not halted altogether, leaving individuals and companies to face a bewildering 
array of regulations—or, in many cases, to face regulations that are extraordinarily 
unclear and haphazardly applied.  
¶3  This Note seeks to introduce the reader to the issue of international cryptography 
regulation by focusing on laws in a select group of countries, including the two largest 
global economies—China and the United States.  Section II of this Comment provides a 
brief introduction to cryptography and its applications.  Section III provides an overview 
of cryptography regulation generally—including its rationale and history—and in a 
selection of important markets.  In Section IV, this Comment discusses the impacts of the 
current global patchwork of encryption regulation on businesses and individuals.  Finally, 
Section V of this Comment proposes security best practices for organizations operating 
internationally.  
II. INTRODUCTION TO ENCRYPTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 
¶4  Encryption is the primary tool that allows for information security in the digital 
age.  In its most basic form, encryption takes a message or document and scrambles it so 
that only intended recipients can view the contents.1  An unencrypted document—for 
example, an email message—can be viewed and understood by anyone who receives it; 
an encrypted document, on the other hand, cannot be read or viewed by unintended 
recipients, even if they have possession of the document itself.  
¶5  Encryption works by taking an original, unsecured document—called the 
cleartext—and using a key to transform it into a secured document—the ciphertext.2  
Cryptography is not new; in fact, encryption in simple forms has been in use for 
thousands of years.  The Roman emperor Julius Caesar employed an encryption method 
based on a very simple key: in his communications, he would shift each letter in the 
alphabet up by three letters.3  The science of cryptography has advanced considerably 
 
1 Tricia E. Black, Note, Taking Account of the World As It Will Be: The Shifting Course of U.S. 
Encryption Policy, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 292 (2001).  
2 D. RICHARD KUHN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC KEY 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL PKI INFRASTRUCTURE 9 (2001), available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-32/sp800-32.pdf. 
3 Nicholas J. Patterson, The Key Theory: Authenticating Decrypted Information in Litigation While 
Protecting Sensitive Sources and Methods, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2010).  




since the time of Caesar, however, and modern encryption methods in widespread use 
today involve complicated mathematical algorithms.4  
¶6  There are two basic types of encryption in contemporary use: symmetric (or 
"private") key systems and asymmetric (or "public") key systems.  Symmetric key 
systems are the simpler of the two.  In a symmetric system, the same key is used to both 
encrypt and decrypt the document.5  A common example of this form of encryption is the 
password protection function of word processors, such as Microsoft Word, by which a 
user can lock a document with a password, and then if she sends the document to a 
colleague, the colleague will need to use the same password to open the document.  This 
form of encryption is sufficient for protection of personal documents, where a user wants 
to prevent everyone but herself from accessing her files.  However, symmetric encryption 
is problematic when one wants to securely communicate with others, because, before the 
secure communication can be initiated, the participants must first agree on a key (or in 
the word processor example above, a password).  While agreeing on a key in advance 
may be easy in an office setting where all participants can communicate face-to-face, this 
is impossible in many common situations.  If the communicating parties are not in the 
same room, symmetric cryptography creates a chicken-and-the-egg problem: before the 
parties can communicate securely, they must first exchange a key, and this exchange 
must occur over an insecure channel, thereby breaking the security of the communication 
before the encryption has even occurred.6  
¶7  The key-exchange problem was solved in the 1970s with the advent of asymmetric 
key systems.7  Whereas in a symmetric key system the same key is used for both 
encryption and decryption, in an asymmetric key system, one key—the public key—is 
used for encryption, and a separate key—the private key—is used for decryption.8  The 
public key and the private key are mathematically related;9 the breakthrough that led to 
the development of asymmetric cryptography was the discovery of mathematical 
arrangements that make it nearly impossible to derive the private key from a user's public 
key.10  A user's public key can be made generally available (e.g., by posting on her 
website), and anyone who wants to send an encrypted document to the user can download 
her public key and use it to encrypt the message.  However, the message cannot then be 
decrypted by anyone—including the original sender of the message—unless they have 
the user's private key, and this key the user keeps secure.11  
¶8  Asymmetric cryptography opened entirely new uses for encryption and facilitated 
the development of many aspects of modern life that we now take for granted.  The 
ability to initiate a secure communications channel between two parties who had never 
before communicated—and who could be complete strangers, and even anonymous—
 
4 Black, supra note 1, at 294–95.  
5 Id. at 296.  
6 See D. RICHARD KUHN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC KEY 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL PKI INFRASTRUCTURE 10 (2001), available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-32/sp800-32.pdf.  
7 Greg Vetter, Patenting Cryptographic Technology, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 757, 761-62 (2010). 
8 Id. at 11.  
9 Id. at 11, 49. 
10 Greg Vetter, Patenting Cryptographic Technology, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 757, 762 (2010).  
11 Black, supra note 1, at 296.  
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 3  
 
676 
made possible the growth of all forms of e-commerce on the Internet.12  Asymmetric 
cryptography underlies Hypertext Transfer Protocol–Secure (HTTPS), which is the 
protocol that allows for secure communication between servers and clients on the World 
Wide Web.13  Without asymmetric cryptography, it would be impossible for users of the 
Internet to communicate securely with e-commerce vendors, online banking websites, 
and the like.  
¶9  The encryption systems in use today can be made extraordinarily secure.  The 
strength of an encryption system is determined by three factors: key security, the security 
of the underlying algorithm, and key length.14   Key security is the responsibility of users, 
and hence is usually the least secure component of a cryptography system.15  Assuming 
that users safeguard their keys, however, modern cryptography systems are very secure.  
The algorithms they use have been extensively researched and tested to ensure 
mathematical security, and the keys used are long enough to make a brute-force attack 
impractical.16  Popular and widely-available encryption software, using tested algorithms 
and sufficiently long keys, can make data virtually impenetrable to attack.17  
¶10  Because data that have been encrypted with a strong cryptography system cannot 
be retrieved without the decryption key, managing those keys is a matter of great 
importance for organizations.  This is particularly important in the case of asymmetric 
cryptography, where a single public-private key pair may be used for innumerable 
communications and transactions; if the private key is lost, all prior communications 
become inaccessible, and the key pair itself becomes unusable.  To manage this risk, the 
concept of key escrow was developed.18  With key escrow, a copy of each decryption key 
is placed in escrow with a trusted third party (TTP); if the key holder loses her copy of 
the key, the TTP can recover it.19  
¶11  Many large organizations operate their own key escrow systems.  A more important 
example of a key escrow system, however, is the case of certificate authorities (CAs).  
Certificate authorities are organizations (either private companies or governmental 
agencies) that issue public-private key pairs to authenticated organizations or 
individuals.20  For example, if an individual wants to start an e-commerce website that 
uses encryption and is trusted by consumer web browsers, that individual can request that 
a certificate authority issue a key pair in her name.  The certificate authority will verify 
that the person requesting the certificate is who she claims to be (by, for example, 
 
12 See id. at 294.  
13 See T. Dierks & E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1.2, NETWORK 
WORKING GROUP (Aug. 2008), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246.  
14 Aaron Perkins, Comment, Encryption Use: Law and Anarchy on the Digital Frontier, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1625, 1628 (2005).  
15 Key security can be compromised by, for example, users writing their passwords on notecards on their 
desks.  
16 Perkins, supra note 14, at 1628-29. A brute-force attack is an attempt to break encryption by trying all 
possible decryption keys. As the key in use is lengthened, the number of possible keys increases 
exponentially, and the system becomes less vulnerable to brute-force attack. D. Forest Wolfe, Comment, 
The Government's Right to Read: Maintaining State Access to Digital Data in the Age of Impenetrable 
Encryption, 49 EMORY L.J. 711, 716 (2000).  
17 Patterson, supra note 3, at 1769–70.  
18 See HAL ABELSON ET AL., THE RISKS OF KEY RECOVERY, KEY ESCROW, AND TRUSTED THIRD-PARTY 
ENCRYPTION 6 (1997), available at http://www.schneier.com/paper-key-escrow.pdf.  
19 Wolfe, supra note 16, at 717.  
20 See Black, supra note 1, at 301.  




requesting a copy of government-issued identification), and once the individual is 
authenticated, the CA will then issue a public-private key pair in her name.  
¶12  Certificate authorities are a critical component of the architecture of the Internet.  A 
relatively small number of certificate authorities are "trusted" by the major web browser 
vendors (such as Microsoft, Mozilla, Google, and Apple). 21  This means that web 
browsers from those vendors automatically assume the validity of encryption keys issued 
or verified by those certificate authorities.  However, certificate authorities also represent 
a potential weakness in the security architecture of the Internet.  Certificate authorities, 
like other trusted third parties, maintain copies of all private keys that they have issued, 
or that have been made available to them.  This means that if a certificate authority is 
compromised, an enormous number of keys may be compromised.  Furthermore, if the 
certificate authority is untrustworthy itself, it may use the decryption keys for unintended 
purposes.22  
¶13  Today, nearly all participants in society use encryption.  Governments and 
corporations use encryption to secure documents, emails, and voice communications.23  
Individuals use encryption—though they likely do not realize it—every time they use the 
Internet to purchase a book, engage in online banking, or otherwise conduct e-
commerce.24  Encryption makes it possible to submit credit card information and other 
sensitive data over the Internet without revealing the information to man-in-the-middle 
attacks and other vulnerabilities.  Encryption also makes possible the creation and use of 
digital signatures, which allow for authentication on the Internet.25  Finally, encryption 
makes it possible for organizations and individuals who wish to communicate without 
fear of government monitoring to do so—whether those individuals be human-rights 
advocates in authoritarian states, terrorists, or narcotics traffickers.  
III. CRYPTOGRAPHY REGULATION AROUND THE WORLD 
A. Cryptography Regulation, Generally 
¶14  Most major countries regulate encryption, to varying degrees.  Encryption is 
regulated because it is a "dual-use" technology; that is, it has both commercial and 
military value.26  The United States pioneered the efforts to regulate encryption during 
the Cold War.27  Since then, U.S. encryption regulation has been driven by two 
competing concerns: "(1) the ability of American high-tech industries to compete in 
foreign markets; and (2) the ability of criminals and terrorists to threaten national security 
 
21 For example, the Firefox web browser and other products from the Mozilla Foundation automatically 
trust certificates issued by over fifty companies. Mozilla Included CA Certificates, MOZILLA, 
http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/included/index.html (last modified June 10, 2013).  
22 This is of particular concern where governments themselves operate certificate authorities.  
23 See Patterson, supra note 3, at 1769–70.  
24 Cf. Black, supra note 1, at 292.  
25 Lyombe Eko & Natasha Tolstikova, To Sign or Not to Sign on the Electronic Dotted Line: The United 
States, the Russian Federation, and International Electronic Signature Policy, 10 INT'L J. COMM. L. & 
POL'Y 1, 2 (2005), available at http://ijclp.net/old_website/10_2005/pdf/ijclp_05_10_2005.pdf.  
26 Aimee Boram Yang, Note, China in Global Trade: Proposed Data Protection Law and Encryption 
Standard Dispute, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 897, 909-10 (2008).  
27 See Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on Technology 
Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 441, 450-52 (2003).  
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through the use of strong encryption."28  However, other countries' encryption regulations 
may be meant to serve other ends, e.g. the monitoring and restriction of domestic speech.  
This regulatory patchwork creates substantial challenges and risks to firms operating 
internationally.  
¶15  In an effort to harmonize regulations on the export and import of dual-use 
technologies, many countries have come together and agreed to a set of principles known 
as the Wassenaar Arrangement.29  The stated goal of the Wassenaar Arrangement was "to 
contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency 
and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies . . . ."30  Cryptography is classified as a dual-use good.31  The Wassenaar 
Arrangement makes symmetric cryptography products of up to 56 bit key length, and 
asymmetric cryptography products of up to 512 bit key length, free from export 
restriction.32  Furthermore, the Wassenaar Arrangement includes a personal-use 
exemption, allowing individuals who travel abroad to carry with them cryptography 
devices for their personal use.33  However, cryptography products that do not fall into 
these exemptions are still eligible for restriction.34  The Wassenaar Arrangement sets 
general parameters for import and export control to which member states largely adhere; 
however, the Wassenaar controls are not binding on member states and are implemented 
at the discretion of member governments.35  
B. Cryptography Regulation in the United States 
¶16  The United States, in addition to being the current primary producer of 
information-technology and security products today, also has among the most well-
developed and documented laws regarding encryption.  Hence, American encryption 
regulation is a useful place to begin an inquiry into the global framework of encryption 
regulation.  The United States does not place any restriction on the domestic use, 
creation, or sale of encryption products domestically.36  Furthermore, there is no 
 
28 Black, supra note 1, at 297.  
29 The Wassenaar member countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
Participating States, WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2013).  
30 Corr, supra note 27, at 455 (quoting Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional 
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Elements 
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/docs/5%20-%20Initial%20Elements.pdf ) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
31 Cf. Bert-Jaap Koops, Crypto Law Survey, CRYPTO LAW SURVEY, 
http://www.cryptolaw.org/cls2.htm#ab (last updated Feb. 2013).  
32 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies , Dual-Use List – Category 5 – Part 2 – “Information Security”, at 87 (Dec. 2012), available 
at http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/2012/WA-LIST%20%2812%29%201/08%20-%20WA-
LIST%20%2812%29%201%20-%20Cat%205P2.doc 
33 Id. at 85. 
34 See id.  
35 See Corr, supra note 27, at 455.  
36 Black, supra note 1, at 298.  Although the U.S. has never placed restrictions on domestic 




restriction on the importation of cryptography systems.37  The exportation of encryption 
products, however, has historically been heavily restricted, and although the restrictions 
have been eased in recent years in many respects, the regulations still present obstacles 
and risks to U.S. businesses operating overseas.38  
1. Regulations on Use 
¶17  The U.S. does not restrict the domestic use of cryptography.  Furthermore, a federal 
district court has held that there is no obligation to reveal one's encryption key or 
password in the context of a criminal investigation.39  However, a recent case has held 
that, while a defendant cannot be compelled to provide his or her decryption key or 
password, he or she can be compelled to provide unencrypted copies of the files or 
documents in question under certain circumstances. 40   In United States v. Fricosu, law 
enforcement agents recovered a laptop with a hard disk that was password-protected and 
encrypted.41  The government sought a warrant to allow it to search the laptop, and also 
sought a writ pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, that would require the 
defendant to produce the unencrypted contents of the computer.42  The defendant 
declined, asserting her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.43  
The Court found that the laptop in question belonged to the defendant, or, in the 
alternative, that she was its sole or primary user, and was able to access the encrypted 
contents.44  Reasoning that "there [was] little question . . . but that the government [knew] 
of the existence and location of the computer's files," the court held that there was no 
incriminating testimonial evidence that would be revealed by compelling the defendant to 
produce the unencrypted documents.45  
2. Regulations on Export 
¶18  The export of encryption products from the United States is regulated by a variety 
of governmental agencies.  The primary regulator of encryption exports is the Commerce 
 
cryptography use, during the 1990s the Clinton Administration pursued several initiatives that sought to 
subject cryptography to more control, particularly for law-enforcement purposes.  The most infamous of 
these initiatives was the Clipper Chip program, which sought to create a standard for voice encryption that 
would have allowed government agents to decrypt encrypted voice communications.  However, after 
lobbying by both the IT industry and privacy advocates the program was essentially abandoned, and the 
U.S. government endorsed the free and unrestricted domestic use of cryptography.  See Vandana Pednekar-
Magal & Peter Shields, The State and Telecom Surveillance Policy: The Clipper Chip Initiative, 8 COMM. 
L. & POL'Y 429, 430 (2003).  
37 Koops, supra note 31.  
38  See section IV.A, infra. 
39 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, the Federal District Court of Vermont "held that the act of 
being compelled to turn over an encryption password has testimonial aspects [and therefore a] defendant 
[is] allowed to refuse to surrender his password under protection of the Fifth Amendment right to refrain 
from testimonial self-incrimination."  Brendan M. Palfreyman, Note, Lessons from the British and 
American Approaches to Compelled Decryption, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 353 (2009) (footnotes omitted).  
40 United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012).  
41 Id. at 1234. 
42 Id. at 1235, 1237. 
43 Id. at 1235. 
44 Id. at 1235–36. 
45 Id. at 1237. 
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Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which administers the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR). 46  The EAR govern the export of any dual-use 
commodities, including encryption systems.47  
¶19  Encryption products are regulated under Category 5, Part 2 of the EAR.48  
Generally, if an item to be exported uses or contains cryptography, is not designed for 
medical end use, and does not limit the use of cryptography to intellectual property or 
copyright protection functions (as with a DVD), then the item is regulated under 
Category 5, Part 2.49  The regulations governing cryptography export have been relaxed 
in recent years,50 but still require exporters to determine for themselves the licenses and 
other documentation required for their software exports, taking into account the software 
to be exported, the person or entity to whom the software is being sold, and additional 
factors.51  
¶20  The first factor exporters must consider is the attributes of the software to be 
exported.  One primary consideration is key length: Category 5, Part 2 specifies that 
encryption systems with key lengths of 56 bits or less for symmetric systems, or 512 bits 
of less for asymmetric systems, can be exported without restriction;52 however, those key 
lengths represent weak encryption, and strong encryption systems, which must use longer 
keys, face export restrictions.53  Furthermore, there is an exemption for so-called "mass 
market" encryption products; if an encryption product is generally available to the public, 
for home or personal use, without continuing support by the supplier (e.g., a personal 
 
46 See John F. McKenzie, U.S. Export Controls on Internet Software Transactions, 44 INT'L LAW. 857, 
858 (2010).  
47 Id. 
48 Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Administration Regulations, Commerce Control List, 
Category 5—Telecommunications and “Information Security” (Dec. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/ear/ccl5_pt2.pdf.  
49 Id.  There are other, more specialized exemptions to Category 5, Part 2 control.  For example, Note 4 
exempts from regulation items that meet all of the following conditions:  
 
 a. The primary function or set of functions is not any of the following:  
  1. 'Information security';  
  2. A computer, including operating systems, parts, and components therefor;  
  3. Sending, receiving or storing information (except in support of entertainment, 
mass commercial broadcasts, digital rights management or medical records management); or  
  4. Networking (including operation, administration, management and provisioning);  
 b. The cryptographic functionality is limited to supporting their primary function or set of 
functions; and  
 c. When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to 
the appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order to ascertain compliance with 
conditions described in paragraphs a. and b. above. 
 
Id. at 1–2.  However, the uses of cryptography central to this article—securing data and communications 
for business and personal purposes—do not fall into this exemption, and hence Note 4 will not be 
considered in detail here.  
50 See, e.g., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, Revisions to Encryption Items 
(Jan. 10, 2000), available at http://epic.org/crypto/export_controls/finalregs.pdf. 
51 See McKenzie, supra note 46, at 858-59.  
52 Bureau of Industry and Security, supra note 48, at 4.  
53 For this reason, until recently it was common to find encryption software available in two versions: 
one version with "weak cryptography" (56 or 512 bits) that was available for general export, and another 
version with "strong cryptography" with limited exportability.  However, as export restrictions have 
generally been relaxed, it is now less common to find such dual versions of cryptography software. 




email security program), then its export is not restricted by this section.54  A final 
important exemption is for products "when accompanying their user for the user's 
personal use or as tools of the trade . . .";55 this allows users to, for example, travel with 
laptops and mobile phones that contain encryption capabilities (as essentially all do).  
¶21  A second important factor for exporters to consider, and that is much more difficult 
for exporters to control, is to whom the software is being sold.  This includes the specific 
attributes of the customer and the customer's location.  The Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC), an agency within the U.S. Treasury Department, administers sanctions 
programs against specific countries, restricting the export of sensitive products and 
materials—including cryptography software—to those locations.56  In addition, OFAC 
administers restrictions against exports to specially designated individuals and entities, 
known as "Specially Designated Nationals" ("SDNs"); exports to those individuals and 
entities are generally prohibited.57  
¶22  These requirements have become even more onerous with the advent of electronic 
software delivery.  Whereas it used to be common for software to be physically delivered 
to the customer (e.g., on a CD-ROM), it is now more common for software products to be 
made available for download via the Internet.  Generally, U.S. export regulators do not 
distinguish between physical shipment and electronic delivery when determining whether 
a firm has made an illegal export.58  Firms that sell encryption software over the Internet, 
therefore, must take steps to screen their customers to assure that they are neither located 
in an embargoed country nor are SDNs.  Unfortunately, it is as yet unclear what kinds of 
steps such firms can, or should, take to ensure compliance.59  Although restrictions on 
export of cryptography have been relaxed, the regulatory environment has, if anything, 
 
54 This is specified in Note 3:  
 
 [The cryptography software regulations] do not control items that meet all of the following: 
 a. Generally available to the public by being sold, without restriction, from stock at retail selling points by 
means of any of the following:  
  1. Over-the-counter transactions;  
  2. Mail order transactions;  
  3. Electronic transactions; or  
  4. Telephone call transactions;  
 b. The cryptographic functionality cannot be easily changed by the user;  
 c. Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier; and  
 d. When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon request, to the 
appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order to ascertain compliance with conditions described 
in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this note. 
 
Bureau of Industry and Security, supra note 48, at 1.  
55 Id.  
56 See Corr, supra note 27, at 461.  Currently, OFAC administers comprehensive sanctions against 
Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.  Additionally, OFAC administers non-comprehensive 
sanctions programs against the Western Balkans, Belarus, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Zimbabwe.  Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx (last updated July 25, 2013).  
57 Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, supra note 56. 
58 See McKenzie, supra note 46, at 860.  
59 Id. at 859.  
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become more challenging; recent years have seen a "shifting of export control 
responsibilities from the government to the private sector."60  As one commentator noted:  
Today's private entities have much greater responsibility for ensuring compliance 
with any applicable regulations.  The penalties for non-compliance are severe, 
and lesser involvement by the agencies on the regulatory side has made 
government resources available on the enforcement side.  Therefore, more than 
ever before, private entities must make sure they have internal compliance or 
export management systems in place to avoid or minimize export control 
violations.61  
¶23  U.S. firms selling or operating abroad must take steps to ensure that they do not 
violate U.S. export regulations whenever their operations involve the use of encryption—
and, increasingly, this applies to every major firm.  
C. Cryptography Regulation in the European Union 
¶24  Cryptography in the European Union (EU), like in the U.S., is free to use 
domestically, but faces restriction on its export.  Export of dual-use goods—which 
includes cryptography—is regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334-2000.  These 
regulations follow the Wassenaar Arrangement.  Export within the European Union is 
fully liberalized.  Exports to a select group of non-EU countries are lightly regulated, and 
exports to remaining countries are more heavily regulated.62  
¶25  The European Union has been a long-time advocate of free domestic use of strong 
cryptography.  In the 1990s, the Clinton Administration pursued several international 
initiatives aimed at encouraging—or even mandating—key escrow.63  The EU, through 
the European Commission, took a stance against those proposals.64  The Commission 
“stresse[d] the economic and societal importance of cryptography,” and noted that “[k]ey 
escrow or key recovery raise a number of practical and complex questions that policy 
makers would need to solve, in particular issues of privacy, vulnerability, effectiveness 
and costs.”65  Hence, European support for the free use of encryption and opposition to 
mandatory key escrow proved critical to the continued development of strong 
cryptography.  
 
60 Corr, supra note 27, at 491–92.  
61 Id.  
62 Dual Use Controls, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-export-
rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/index_en.htm (last updated July 8, 2013).  The countries for which 
the lighter regulations apply are the United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Norway.  
Id. 
63 Mandatory key escrow would have required that copies of all encryption keys be kept on file with a 
trusted third party.  This way, if the government wanted access to an individual's or entity's 
communications (e.g., for law enforcement purposes), they could obtain a court order for the trusted third 
party to reveal the keys.  
64 Black, supra note 1, at 302.  
65 Koops, supra note 31 (internal quotation mark omitted).  




D.  Cryptography Regulation in China 
¶26  China is one of the most challenging environments for cryptography use and 
regulation.   Importation and exportation of cryptography products are both highly 
regulated.  Import and export of encryption products require a license from the State 
Encryption Management Commission.66  Encryption is regulated primarily by the 
National Commission on Encryption Code Regulations (NCECR).  Encryption products 
cannot be sold or imported in China without prior approval by NCECR.67  Furthermore, 
individuals and firms in China can only use cryptography products approved by the 
NCECR.68  This also applies to foreign individuals and firms operating in China, who 
must report details of their encryption systems to, and receive approval to use those 
products from, the NCECR.69  One scholar has reported that, “[a]ccording to a 
‘clarification letter’ sent to US businesses in China in early March 2000,” the restrictions 
on import and use of cryptography involve:  
only hardware and software for which encryption and decoding operations are 
core functions.  As a result, products in which cryptography is only built-in (such 
as mobile phones and browser software) are exempted. . . .  However, the 
clarification letter only seems to apply to pre-2000 products.  All products since 
2000 seem to require a license.70  
¶27  However, according to the international law firm Baker & McKenzie, the 
clarification letter has been disavowed by Chinese authorities, and, for practical purposes, 
all encryption products, regardless of key strength or other factors, are fully regulated.71  
¶28  In addition to restricting the import and use of encryption technologies to those 
firms that have received governmental approval, the Chinese government has in many 
instances pursued a policy of favoring the development of domestic cryptography 
systems.  An important example of this involved systems for secure wireless local area 
network (LAN) connectivity.  The international standard for wireless connectivity, used 
almost everywhere worldwide, is the 802.11 standard promulgated by the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).72  However, in 2003, the Chinese 
government announced the creation of a new Chinese standard for wireless LAN 
security—the WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI)—and stated that 
wireless LAN (or Wi-Fi) systems sold in China would have to conform to the WAPI, not 
 
66 Shangyong Mima Guanli Tiaoli (商用密码管理条例) [Regulation of Commercial Encryption Codes] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Directive No. 273, Oct. 7, 1999, effective Oct. 7, 1999) (China), 
available at http://newmedia.cityu.edu.hk/cyberlaw/gp3/pdf/law_encryption.pdf.  
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Koops, supra note 31.  
71 Baker & McKenzie, New Chinese Tariff Classifications for Encryption Products, CHINA LEGAL DEV. 
BULL., April-June 2009, at 11, 12, available at 
http://www.amchamchina.org/download?path=/cmsfile/2009/06/24/551b9aab50bbd64c3f33a7913ea3d9ce.
pdf.  
72 Yang, supra note 26, at 908. 
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the 802.11, standard.73  Furthermore, foreign companies that wished to sell Wi-Fi devices 
in China would have to co-produce their products with designated Chinese firms.74  
¶29  The WAPI standard was heavily opposed by international IT firms, largely because 
they saw it as a protectionist tool used by the Chinese government to favor their own 
domestic technology producers.75  Another reason for opposing WAPI, however, was the 
fear that the domestic cryptography standard would create a functional key escrow 
system that would allow the Chinese government easier access to encrypted 
communications.  The WAPI episode indicates that the Chinese government will 
continue to be heavily involved in the market for, and in the use of, cryptography 
technologies in China.  
IV. IMPACTS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY REGULATIONS 
¶30  Restrictions on cryptography have deleterious effects on at least three groups: (1) 
information technology and security companies wishing to compete in international 
markets; (2) firms operating abroad that desire to use cryptography to protect their data 
and communications; and (3) individuals and groups in countries with restrictions on use 
of cryptography who would like to protect their data from corporate or government 
interference.  
A. Effects on IT Industry 
¶31  Varying cryptography regulations worldwide place substantial burdens on 
information technology and security firms looking to expand into new markets.  Many 
analysts believe that U.S. export controls have placed American IT firms at a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors.76  Furthermore, all IT and security firms—not 
just those based in the U.S.—face increased costs due to compliance with foreign import 
requirements.  Finally, to the extent that encryption regulations in major markets (e.g. 
China) constrain demand for cryptography services in those countries, security firms are 
disadvantaged.  
¶32  The effects of cryptography regulations on IT firms extend beyond the market for 
cryptography software, however.  Many information technology products, services, and 
businesses depend upon strong cryptography.  For example, e-commerce (exemplified by 
Amazon.com in the U.S.) would not have flourished had customers feared that every time 
they made a purchase online, they were placing their credit card information at risk of 
compromise; yet this fear would be justified in the absence of strong cryptography to 
protect the information in transit.  By limiting the use of cryptography, countries hinder 
the development of their IT and e-commerce markets in general.  
 
73 Yang, supra note 26, at 908, 912–15.  
74 Id. at 914.  
75 Id. at 909, 916.  The administration of President George W. Bush agreed, and it successfully lobbied 
China to delay indefinitely the introduction of WAPI as a mandatory standard.  Id. at 915–17.  
76 See, e.g., Black, supra note 1, at 297.  




B. Effects on Overseas Business Activities 
¶33  Restrictions on importation and use of cryptography have substantial effects on the 
operations of multinational firms.  Network managers for firms in the West tend to design 
encryption technologies into their voice and data networks to protect the contents of their 
telephone calls, emails, documents, and databases; however, when they wish to use these 
same technologies abroad, they must tailor their systems to the restrictions of each 
country in which they operate, or they may violate local laws and regulations.77  These 
difficulties are amplified where laws are unclear or inconsistently enforced, a situation 
common in many developing countries.  As Bruce Schneier, a noted encryption expert, 
observed, “Rules are often hard to find and hard to follow [because] governments want 
people not to do anything.”78  
¶34  China presents a particularly difficult case. As discussed above, Chinese encryption 
regulations have often been volatile and vague.  While Chinese restrictions on 
cryptography facially apply to foreign firms doing business in China, “[a]ccording to 
attorneys familiar with the matter, Chinese officials say the encryption restrictions are 
aimed at Chinese citizens, not foreign corporations.”79  Nevertheless, “companies can 
expect the Chinese government to ask for details about the encryption they're using—in 
addition to requiring them to appoint an ‘encryption contact’ who will give the 
government the encryption keys when asked.”80  The Vice President for Security Services 
at one multinational firm noted, “We have part of our business in Beijing. . . .  If you 
encrypt data in China, you have to provide the Chinese government the ability to access 
the keys.  By this regulation, the Chinese should be able to get access to [Secure Sockets 
Layer]-encrypted traffic, too.”81  Because of these restrictions, he noted that many 
businesses do not use encryption in China, even if cryptography is a standard component 
of their IT infrastructure elsewhere.82  China is far from alone in having opaque and 
inconsistent encryption regulations; in Russia, where the Federal Agency of 
Governmental Communications and Information has issued regulations requiring 
government approval to use encryption, “the interpretation of the rules seem to vary 
according to which government official you contact . . . ."83  
¶35  Restrictions on the import and use of cryptography affect businesses in several 
important ways.  If firms cannot use encryption devices to secure their data and 
communications in a given country, then their intellectual property in that country is put 
at substantial risk.  The situation is perhaps even worse where regulations are unclear and 
inconsistently applied, as is the case in China, Russia, and elsewhere; in such situations, a 
firm must decide between avoiding cryptography but exposing its data to compromise, 
and using cryptography but exposing itself to sanctions.  Such regulatory uncertainty will 
tend to favor well-connected firms at the expense of market newcomers, undermining the 
competitiveness of the market and discouraging new entrants.  
 
77 Ellen Messmer, Encryption Restrictions, NETWORK WORLD (Mar. 14, 2004, 10:05 PM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/careers/2004/0315man.html.  
78 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. (alteration in original). 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
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C. Effects on Organizations and Individuals in Highly-Regulated Countries 
¶36  Finally, it should not be forgotten that limitations on the use of cryptography by 
individuals and organizations remove a potent tool to preserve privacy and communicate 
in the face of governmental opposition.  Encryption makes it far easier for human rights 
advocates, dissent movements, and the like to communicate and organize.84  Where 
encryption software is unavailable or illegal, these movements will find it much harder to 
organize, and this can have deleterious effects on the promotion of socially valuable 
change.  
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES 
¶37  Best practices for American firms operating abroad encompass two aspects: (1) 
compliance with U.S. export regulations, and (2) compliance with foreign import and use 
regulations.  
A. Compliance with U.S. Export Regulations 
¶38  Because of the complex nature of U.S. export regulations, and the harsh penalties 
for violating those regulations, any major American company operating abroad that either 
sells products that include cryptography, or utilizes cryptography in its lines of business, 
should institute internal compliance programs.  The U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau 
of Industry and Security encourages internal compliance programs to incorporate 
particular components, including: (1) “a written corporate policy statement discussing the 
importance of compliance with all export control laws and regulations”; (2) internal 
procedures for correctly classifying all products according to their applicable regulatory 
classifications, and for ensuring that these classifications are communicated to 
salespeople; (3) procedures for screening customers against both the lists of 
prohibited/restricted countries, and the lists of prohibited individuals and entities 
(Specially Designated Nationals); (4) programs for monitoring the activity of the firm's 
U.S. persons and subsidiaries abroad, and also the activities of the firm's foreign 
affiliates;85 (5) step-by-step clearance procedures that must be undertaken before delivery 
of a product, and keeping record of those procedural steps for each delivery; (6) training 
and auditing for relevant personnel; (7) due diligence in corporate transactions, including 
foreign mergers and acquisitions;86 and (8) procedures for notification and enforcement in 
 
84 See ALEX COMNIOS, ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMC’NS, TWITTER REVOLUTIONS AND CYBER 
CRACKDOWNS: USER-GENERATED CONTENT AND SOCIAL NETWORKING IN THE ARAB SPRING AND BEYOND 15, 17 
(2011), available at http://www.apc.org/en/system/files/AlexComninos_MobileInternet.pdf.  
85 Corr, supra note 27, at 516-18. 
Under OFAC regulations, U.S. companies and U.S. persons in those companies may risk 
liability if their overseas affiliates engage in transactions with embargoed countries and 
OFAC decides the U.S. companies or persons participated.  Likewise, . . . BIS could arguably 
impute liability to U.S. companies or persons if an overseas affiliate ships to a prohibited end-
use or end-user, and BIS decides the U.S. persons should have known."   
Id. at 518.  
86 Id. at 518–20. 
BIS announced in late 2002 that 'corporations will be held accountable for violations of U.S. 
export control laws committed by companies that they acquire.'  This warning makes clear 




case of any violations or suspected violations.87  None of the components are simple to 
implement, but they are all necessary in light of the substantial penalties that can result 
from even inadvertent illegal export.  
¶39  In addition to ensuring that the firm's customer-facing practices are in compliance 
with U.S. export regulations, a firm must also take steps to prevent internal systems—
particularly IT systems—from allowing for inadvertent violations of export law.  For 
purposes of U.S. regulations, the term “export” includes: “(1) transmission of data and 
software by email or otherwise over a computer network to foreign access points; (2) 
posting or storing information on a computer network such as a company intranet site or 
a shared library, folder, or database, if persons outside the United States have access; and 
(3) access of foreign nationals both abroad, and on-site in the United States, to network 
data and software.”88  Therefore, simply making software available from a central server 
for installation on networked PCs—a standard configuration for company networks—
could place the firm in violation of export regulations if that software contains strong 
cryptography and the firm networks are accessible from foreign locations.  Corr 
recommends a four-part compliance program for managing such systems: (1) identify all 
data and software on the network that could be subject to export controls; (2) segregate 
the data and software that are subject to control (for example, by placing them on a 
separate network drive); (3) restrict non-U.S. persons and entities from access to those 
segregated areas; and (4) “[d]irect [r]equests for [a]ccess to [c]ontrolled [t]echnologies to 
[d]esignated [i]n-[h]ouse [c]ompliance [m]anagers.”89  
B. Compliance with Foreign Encryption Regulations 
¶40  While compliance with U.S. export regulations is complicated enough, compliance 
with foreign encryption regulations presents a great deal more difficulty.  Many countries 
do not have clear regulations or guidelines for importation, exportation, and use of 
encryption, and even those countries that have clear guidelines often suffer from 
inconsistent enforcement.  It is therefore extraordinarily important to develop country-
specific policies that address the particular regulatory environment in each country, the 
firm's particular needs in that country, and the risks associated with eschewing 
cryptography in that jurisdiction.  
¶41  Where a firm decides not to use cryptography in a given country, it must take 
additional steps to protect its data and intellectual property from compromise.  One of the 
most important considerations is the selection of networking connectivity provider.  
Where a firm or individual can utilize strong cryptography to protect communications 
over the network, the trustworthiness and reliability of the network provider are less 
 
that, although the focus of export compliance programs is on day-to-day-operations, the 
breadth and scope of U.S. export controls also may reach larger, higher-level corporate 
transactions.  Multinational corporations, as well as financial companies such as commercial 
and investment banks, are well-advised to implement due diligence compliance measures in 
connection with mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures, as well as distribution, licensing, 
and sales agreements. 
Id. at 520 (footnote omitted). 
87 Id. at 520.  
88 Id. at 522.  
89 Id. at 522–25.  
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relevant.  However, where data—including email and voice communications—must be 
sent unencrypted over the network, choosing a network provider that is both trustworthy, 
and has strong security systems and procedures of its own in place, is of paramount 
importance.  
¶42  Additionally, where a firm chooses not to use encryption, it should act to minimize 
the amount and sensitivity of the data accessible from within the country.  The first part 
of such a program should be determining what data do and do not need to be accessible to 
in-country staff; data that do not need to be available in-country should be moved to 
secure locations (e.g. to a data center in the firm's home country) and made inaccessible 
to in-country employees (so that data do not travel over unsecured network links).  Data 
that need to be accessible to in-country employees should be divided between data that 
are only needed by in-country employees or data that are needed enterprise-wide.  The 
former should be stored locally, on-premise, at the in-country business entity, so that the 
data are not disseminated over insecure communications links.  Where the firm has 
multiple in-country locations, at least some data would likely need to be shared among 
offices, but as much data as possible should be stored off-network. 
¶43  Where a firm in a country with restrictions on cryptography and implied 
governmental rights to decryption keys (like China) chooses to use encryption, it should 
nevertheless take measures that it would not take in the U.S., Europe, or other locations.  
Because the government in such countries can demand access to decryption keys, those 
keys should never be used to protect, or to grant access to, sensitive enterprise 
information.  Furthermore, encryption keys for in-country users should be changed 
regularly, and old keys should be expired at a faster rate so that the compromise of a 
given key provides access to less data.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶44  Cryptography is essential for the secure operation of nearly all organizations, and is 
key to protecting the privacy of individuals worldwide.  Despite its importance, however, 
and despite the fact that many countries place strong restrictions on the use of 
cryptography, too many organizations neglect to consider the regulatory implications of 
cryptography use in their international organizations.  All internationally active firms 
must take steps to ensure that they are in compliance with encryption regulations in all 
countries where they do business, and at the same time must adopt best practices to 
maximize their information security in spite of restrictions on cryptography use.  
 
